مشخصات مقاله | |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | مدیر عاملان یک دلاری |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | One dollar CEOs |
انتشار | مقاله سال ۲۰۲۰ |
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | ۱۵ صفحه |
هزینه | |
پایگاه داده | نشریه الزویر |
نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article) |
مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس میباشد |
نمایه (index) | Scopus – Master Journals List – JCR |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
۵٫۳۵۲ در سال ۲۰۱۹ |
شاخص H_index | ۱۵۸ در سال ۲۰۲۰ |
شاخص SJR | ۱٫۶۸۴ در سال ۲۰۱۹ |
شناسه ISSN | ۰۱۴۸-۲۹۶۳ |
شاخص Quartile (چارک) | Q1 در سال ۲۰۱۹ |
مدل مفهومی | ندارد |
پرسشنامه | ندارد |
متغیر | دارد |
رفرنس | دارد |
رشته های مرتبط | مدیریت، حسابداری |
گرایش های مرتبط | مدیریت اجرایی، مدیریت عملکرد، مدیریت مالی، حسابداری مالی |
نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
مجله | مجله تحقیقات کسب و کار – Journal Of Business Research |
دانشگاه | School of Economics and Management, University of Minho & NIPE, Braga 4710-057, Portugal |
کلمات کلیدی | جبران خدمات مدیر ارشد اجرایی، ویژگی های مدیر عامل اجرایی، عملکرد شرکت، بازسازی، مدیر عاملان جاافتاده |
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | CEO compensation، CEO characteristics، Firm performance، Restructuring، Entrenched CEOs |
شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.11.086 |
فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
Abstract۱- Introduction
۲- Theories and hypotheses ۳- Sample and methods ۴- Results ۵- Discussion and conclusions References |
بخشی از متن مقاله: |
Abstract
We study the impact of $1 CEO salaries on firm performance and CEO total compensation. We find that, on average, $1 CEO firms earn higher total compensation and lower stock market returns relative to their peers after the adoption of $1 salaries. The effect on total compensation is mitigated if the $1 CEO firm is undergoing restructuring or the CEO is entrenched and aggravated if the CEO is overconfident. The stock market underperformance especially affects firms not under a restructuring process and firms with entrenched or overconfident CEOs. Introduction Though scholars debate whether U.S. CEOs are drawing excessive compensation (Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle, & Joo, 2018; Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Sauerwald, Lin, & Peng, 2016; Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006), some CEOs have settled for an annual salary of only $1. During the last financial crisis (2007–۲۰۰۹), the CEOs of all three major U.S. automakers pledged to work for an annual salary of only $1. This presumably sacrificial step is not unique to economic crises. Scores of CEOs—including those with thriving firms such as Apple—have also adopted this compensation arrangement since the early 1990s. Many of these firms are household names from a very wide variety of industries.1 Although the $1 CEO salary is not a common arrangement, or perhaps because of that, announcements of $1 CEO salaries receive great public attention.2 Besides all the publicity surrounding the adoption of such compensation schemes, little is known about their impact on corporate outcomes. Researchers have always considered the fixed salary as a main pillar of a CEO compensation package (Murphy, 1999, chap. 38) and one of the major components of reservation utility in compensation contract models (see, for example, Garen, 1994; Dittmann & Maug, 2007). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study in the managerial compensation literature directly examines how salary cuts would affect total compensation design (including equity pay) and firm performance. |